Legal Frameworks and How to Monitor Them

Advancing Accountable Resource Governance in Asia Pacific

January 2018

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Session Plan

- 1. Legal hierarchy how the state structures its management of the industry
- 2. Zooming in on contracts opportunities and risks
- 3. What can we do? Advocacy, monitoring and enforcement

1. Legal Structure and Hierarchy


Why does the legal framework governing the oil or mining sector matter?

Three areas of focus today:

- a. Sets the institutional structure for the state.
- b. Sets the relationships between government and companies.
- c. Sets checks and balances between the state, companies and citizens.

What are the key laws and other legal instruments that govern oil and mining?


Legal Structure and Hierarchy




Institutional structure: where are rules established?

Type of text	Issues covered	Examples of specific documents
Constitution	Role of legislature, freedom of information, state ownership, basic institutional responsibilities	
Legislation	Roles, responsibilities, oversight of state institutions	Petroleum Act, Minerals Act, State-Owned Enterprises Act, Extractive Industries Transparency Act
Regulation	Specific powers of state agencies, modes of implementation	Petroleum Regulations, Minerals Regulations, Operational Regulations
Contracts	Roles of ministries or SOEs vis-à-vis specific projects	PSAs, concession agreements, Offtake agreements

Rules for companies: Mining Royalties in Colombia



Reality can be messier



Institutional Structure – four key roles to allocate



Archetype 1: Norway









Archetype 2: Malaysia

Commercial Operations



Monitoring and Regulation


National Development

Policy


Accountability mechanisms are critical for effective institutions

- 1. Clear roles and responsibilities
- 2. Technocratic leadership/boards of directors
- 3. Meritocratic hiring and promotion
- 4. Extensive (and effectively-tailored) investment in skills development
- 5. Transparent reporting on activities and results

2. Oil and mining contracts a. Why do we have them?




In petroleum....




Split license system

In mining, frequently....




Three risks to manage – Risk 1: Project Timeline (mining)

- **Exploration Costs**
- Development Costs
- Mining Revenue
- Mine Operation Costs
- Closure Costs



Risk 1: Project Timeline (oil and gas)



Risk 2: exploration


Drilling success rates and discovery sizes 2010-2014

	Frontier	Emerging	Maturing	Mature
Commercial Success Rate	8%	47%	30%	36%
Average Discovery Size mmboe	352	353	74	30
Drilling Cost \$/boe	3.0	0.4	2.0	2.4

Based on drilling results of 40 mid and large cap E&P companies, does not include Appraisal costs of pre-drilling seismic and studies. Approximate full finding cost is 3x drilling cost

Risk 3: market volatility

WEO Oil Price Forecasts 2002-2020 (Monthly prices, 2015 U.S. Dollar per Barrel)



Source: IMF

How much should terms be standardized? How much should vary by contract?



"As far as possible, terms should be written into legislation that can be more clearly scrutinized; any remaining concessions which depart from standard legislated terms should be submitted to and approved by the legislature."

Oil and mining contracts b. Key features and typologies


Agreement Type	Key Features	Examples
Concession (Royalty/Tax)	Company owns 100% of the produced resource	UK, US, Colombia, Brazil
Production Sharing	Produced resource is split among government and company, company gets entitlement to recover costs plus some share of profit	Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Angola
Service Contract	Government retains ownership, companies are paid a fee	Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Bolivia

Content of agreements can include.....

- Term and length of contract
- Work program obligations
- Contractor rights, obligations and liabilities
- Discovery and appraisal
- Development and production
- Cost recovery, Fiscal terms
- Measurement of mineral/petroleum
- Confidentiality

- Change of ownership
- Environmental protection and safety
- Local content
- Abandonment/rehabilitation
- Accounting procedures
- Company Guarantees
- Termination
- Governing law and arbitration
- Stabilisation


Royalty/Tax Regime



Royalty/Tax: Key Issues

Subject	Concession Features
Direction of Payments	Contractor pays government
Distinguishing Government Revenue Streams	Royalties and Income Taxes
Other Possible Revenue Streams	Bonus, Dividends from State Equity, Dividend Withholding Tax, Windfall Profits Tax, Fees
Key Issues in System Design	Setting appropriate royaltyTax rates and rules on deductionsProviding some measure of progressivity
Advantages	Simplicity
Disadvantages	No built-in progressivity, alignment of incentives

Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs)



PSAs: Key Issues

Subject	PSA Features
Direction of Payments	Contractor pays government taxes and (sometimes) royalties; Government sells share of petroleum
Distinguishing Government Revenue Streams	Production share
Other Possible Revenue Streams	Royalties, Income Tax, Bonus, Dividends from State Equity, Dividend Withholding Tax, Windfall Profits Tax, Fees
Key Issues in System Design	Cost Recovery RulesSystem for Production SplitOversight of National Oil Company
Advantages	Direct government role in oil sales, alignment of incentives, easy to build in progressivity
Disadvantages	Increased potential for conflict of interest

PSA Examples: Profit-oil split


Production-based: Nigeria (Bonga deepwater)

Cumulative Production	Profit-oil split
< 350 mb	20% state / 80% contractor
351 – 750 mb	35% state / 65% contractor
751 – 1000 mb	45% state / 55% contractor
1001 – 1500 mb	50% state / 50% contractor
1501 – 2000 mb	60% state / 40% contractor

IRR-based: Azerbaijan (ACG)

Internal Rate of Return	Profit-oil split
RROR < 16.75%	30% state / 70% contractor
16.75% < RROR < 22.75%	55% state / 45% contractor
RROR > 22.75%	80% state / 20% contractor

Service Contract Financial Flows: Bolivia



Service Contracts: Key Issues

Subject	Service Contract Features
Direction of Payments	Government sells all petroleum, pays fee to contractor
Distinguishing Government Revenue Streams	Sale of production
Other Possible Revenue Streams	Royalties, Income Tax, Bonus, Dividends from State Equity, Dividend Withholding Tax, Windfall Profits Tax, Fees
Key Issues in System Design	Determination of FeeOversight of National Oil Company
Advantages	High levels of government control over operations and petroleum
Disadvantages	Incentives for contractors may be inadequate (particularly upside); Increased potential for conflict of interest

Arbitration and stabilization

#COMMODITIES JANUARY 7, 2018 / 6:51 AM / 3 DAYS AGO

Libya's NOC says wins arbitration on Ras Lanuf refinery, calls for restart

Reuters Staff



Exxon Mobil Wants To Enforce \$188M Venezuela Award

By Natalie Olivo

Freeport warns of arbitration as Indonesia mining dispute escalates

BSGR seeks arbitration against Guinea over loss of mining rights

Total seeks arbitration over Uganda tax dispute

Can you change a contract once it's been finalized?



Oil and mining contracts c. How are they awarded?

Key Goals:

- 1. Pick the "right" company
- 2. Get the best terms for the State
- 3. Limit / eliminate corruption
- 4. Reflect broader sector goals
- ...important for system to be consistent with legal framework.

Do you award contracts through a competitive process?

Generally, competitive bidding allows country to:

- choose best among pool of bidders
- have a stronger negotiating position to get best terms
- increase transparency and minimize discretion / discrimination


Auctions in Iraq - 2009

\$2.80/barrel:

Difference between fee bid by Exxon & the winning bid of CNPC/BP for Rumaila oil field.

\$750m:

Extra accruing to Iraq per year from 1m barrels per day (bpd) production of the Rumaila field.



Risk of post-bid negotiation



Source: Guardian and Platform London

Good practices

Competitive processes	All processes
Limited number of biddable variables	Maximize geological information before process
Make ranking and relative weight of variables clear	Limit variance from standardized legal rules
Build (or contract) sufficient expertise to run the process	Publish the reasons for selection, identity of the winner and the licenses/contracts
Competitive but realistic fiscal conditions	Require strong technical/financial qualifications

SOEs in the license allocation process

Rule for SOE access to upstream projects	Example(s)
SOE has monopoly over all E&P	Saudi Arabia, Mexico (up to 2013)
SOE has guaranteed role/option	Algeria, Malaysia, Brazil (deepwater "pre-salt" fields)
Application with favor	Kazakhstan, Mexico (now)
Full competition	Norway, Colombia

3. What can we do?

In your work, how do you engage to improve the legal framework governing extractive industries?

a. We can understand!



An example






Shah Deniz Project, Azerbaijan


Oyu Tolgoi Project, Mongolia

b. We can advocate for transparency



http://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/paris-declaration-briefing-transparency-and-open-contracts-in-the-natural-resource-sector-web.pdf

Resource Governance Index: Contract Disclosure Practice




http://resourcegovernanceindex.org/data/both/issue?category=1&indicator=10®ion=global&subcategory=1

EITI and Contract Disclosure

- The EITI Report should provide an **overview of any contracts and licenses that are already publicly available**, and include a reference or link to the location where these are published. (§3.12(b))
- The EITI Report must document the government's policy on disclosure of contracts and licenses related to both exploration and exploitation, including relevant legal provisions, actual disclosure practices and any reforms that are planned or underway. (§3.12(b))
- EITI implementing countries are *encouraged* to **publicly disclose any contracts and licenses** that provide the terms attached to the exploitation of oil, gas and minerals. (§3.12(a))


c. We can monitor compliance

Resource Governance Index: countries often do not follow their own rules.



Tools available to monitor obligations


Country EITI Reports



www.resourcecontracts.org




https://aleph.openoil.net/





Annex 2: Breakdown of licenses and oil companies


Licence reference	Operator	Companies	Extracted product	Licence type	Granted	Expires	Area
JPDA 03-12	ConocoPhillips	ConocoPhilips Santos Inpex Sahul Eni Tokyo Timor Sea Resources	Condensate, LPG, LNG	PSC	02/04/2003	06/02/2022	JPDA
JPDA 03-13	ConocoPhillips	ConocoPhilips Santos Inpex Sahul	Condensate, LPG, LNG	PSC	02/04/2003	16/12/2021	JPDA
JPDA 03-19	Woodside Petroleum	Woodside petroleum Shell Development Osaka Gas Sunrise Conoco Phillips	Gas	PSC	02/04/2003	04/10/2026	JPDA
JPDA 03-20	Woodside Petroleum	Woodside petroleum Shell Development Osaka Gas Sunrise Conoco Phillips	Gas	PSC	02/04/2003	13/11/2026	JPDA
JPDA 06-101 A	Minza Oil & Gas	Minza Oil & Gas	na	PSC	09/03/2007	09/03/2014	JPDA
JPDA 06-102	Petronas	Petronas Carigali Korean Gas Samsung Oil & Gas LG	na	PSC	29/12/2006	29/12/2010	JPDA
JPDA 06-103	Oilex	Oilex Japan Energy Corporation Videocon Bharat PetroResources GSPC Pan Pacific Petroleum	na	PSC	15/01/2007	15/01/2014	JPDA


Moore Stephens LLP











Key steps for monitoring

- 1. Understand the obligation
- 2. Check all available sources
- 3. Estimate what compliance would look like, and compare that against reality
- 4. Ask questions, rinse, repeat
- 5. Communicate with key stakeholders

Example - Excise Taxes at the Rio Tuba Mine














EITI reports give us numbers


MINING	Per participating entity	Per government agency	Variance pre- reconciliation	Reconciled amount	Variance post- reconciliation
Pacific Nickel	Phils., Inc.				
Corporate income tax	-	8,612	(8,612)	8,612	
Excise tax on minerals	-	-	-	-	
Withholding tax - Foreign shareholder dividends	-	-	-	-	
Withholding ta: - Royalties to claim owners	-	-	-	-	
SUBTOTAL	-	8,612	(8,612)	8,612	
Platinum Grou	p Metals Corporation				
Corporate income tax	326,489	326,489	-	326,489	
Excise tax on minerals	239,735,279	239,735,278	1	239,735,278	
Withholding tax - Foreign shareholder	562,242,930	55,359,708	000,000 222	55,359,708	
dividends Withbuding tax					
- Loyalties to claim owners	-	-	-	-	
SUBTOTAL	802,304,698	295,421,475	506,883,223	295,421,475	
Rio Tuba Nick	el Mining Corporation				
Corporate income tax	1,287,083,962	1,287,082,163	1,799	1,287,082,163	
Excise tax on minerals	138,531,277	107,714,867	30,816,410	107,714,867	
Withholding tax - Foreign shareholder dividends	288,310,548	288,310,548	-	288,310,548	
Withholding tax - Royalties to claim owners	-	-	-	-	
SUBTOTAL	1,713,925,787	1,683,107,578	30,818,209	1,683,107,578	
Shuley Mine,	Incorporated				
Corporate income tax	198,766,250	198,766,250	-	198,766,250	
Excise tax on minerals	42,745,544	42,745,544	-	42,745,544	
Withholding tax - Foreign shareholder dividends				/	
Withholding ta: - Royalties to claim owners	-	-	-	-	
SUBTOTAL	241,511,794	241,511,794		241,511,794	
SUBTOTAL	241,511,794	241,511,794	-	241,511,794	
194	PwC				

Rio Tuba payments to government, 2014, PHP (post-reconciliation)			
Corporate income tax	1,287,082,163		
Excise tax	107,714,867		
Withholding on foreign shareholder dividends	288,310,548		
Withholding on royalties to claim owners	0		
SUBTOTAL	1,683,107,578		









"The government share shall be the excise tax on mineral products at the time of removal and at the rate provided for in Republic Act No. 7729 amending Section 151(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code..."

Referring to the law, which was enacted in 1994

"SEC. 151. Mineral Products. -

- "(A) Rates of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on minerals, mineral products and quarry resources, excise tax as follows:
 - "(1) On coal and coke, a tax of Ten pesos (P10.00) per metric ton;
 - "(2) On all nonmetallic minerals and quarry resources, a tax of two percent (2%) based on the actual market value of the gross output thereof at the time of removal, in the case of those locally extracted or produced; or the value used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, net of excise tax and value-added tax, in the case of importation.

Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph (4) of subsection (A) of this Section, locally extracted natural gas and liquefied natural gas shall not be subject to the excise tax imposed herein.

- "(3) On all metallic minerals, a tax based on the actual market value of the gross output thereof at the time of removal, in the case of those locally extracted or produced; or the value used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, net of excise tax and value-added tax, in the case of importation, in accordance with the following schedule:
 - "(a) Copper and other metallic minerals;
 - "(i) On the first three (3) years upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7729, one percent (1%);
 - "(ii) On the fourth and the fifth years, one and a half percent (1 1/2%); and
 - "(iii) On the sixth year and thereafter, two percent (2%);
 - "(b) Gold and chromite,' two percent (2%).

Using 2014 EITI data to estimate what should have been paid – from EITI report, page 73

		Iron	
	Nickel	Ore/Concentrate	Limestone
Export Volume (metric ton)	915,805	1,353,255.00	0
Local Sales Volume (metric ton)	428,978	0	3,382,826
Export Sales Value (PHP)	2,073,873,725	2,692,457,125	0
Local Sales Value (PHP)	316,144,756	0	1,538,694,120
Total Sales Value (PHP)	2,390,018,481	2,692,457,125	1,538,694,120

What tax rate applies to nickel? 2%

What tax rate applies to iron? 2%

What tax rate applies to limestone? 2%

If it is 2014, how do we calculate?

Actual market value of gross output at time of removal



2%

Excise tax

So what would we have expected the company to have paid the government in 2014?

	Nickel Production Value	2,390,018,481
+	Iron Production Value	2,692,457,125
+	Limestone Production Value	1,538,694,120
	= TOTAL PRODUCTION VALUE	6,621,169,726
	* Excise tax rate	2%

= EXPECTED EXCISE TAX PAYMENT

132,423,395

How do they line up?

Our estimation	Actual excise tax payment, per EITI report
132,423,395	107,714,867

Difference in absolute terms	Difference in relative terms
24,708,527 PHP (551,783 USD)	19%

What do we do with this information?




?

Maybe.....

.....but not usually

What might explain the difference?

Price variations over the course of the year?



What might explain the difference?

Remember the language of the law?

Tax is based on "the actual market value....at the time of removal....."

What questions would you want to ask the government or the companies?

Communicating with stakeholders



http://www.grupofaro.org/content/an%C3%A1lisis-econ%C3%B3mico-y-socio-ambiental-del-primer-contrato-deminer%C3%AD-gran-escala-una-mirada-de



https://www.opencontracting.org/2013/11/18/putting_contract_transparency_to _work/

Thank you.

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